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ABSTRACT
This article explores the question of what is a “subject-of-a-life,” 
Tom Regan’s celebrated term for a living entity to whom, he argued, 
we humans owe ethical duty. I return to ancient concepts of entelechy 
and teleological organization, arguing that, stripped of theological 
implications, they provide a usable basis for modern theorizing about 
organism and an ethical foundation for condemning such practices 
as transgenic engineering. Every creature, it is argued, has its own 
inherited formal identity, which it strives to sustain. This reality is 
ethically pertinent knowledge which humans are obliged to respect 
and honor. 
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There is at root no physical reason for individuality to 
be self-identical from one day to the next. . . the self 
abides within and despite constant flux.
—Marilynne Robinson 
The Givenness of Things (2015)
Every being is its own grand narrative.
—Andreas Weber 
Biopoetics (2016)
This article is an attempt at definition, providing a survey of 
non-theological ideas about what is a “subject-of-a-life.”
In his groundbreaking The Case for Animal Rights (1983), 
Tom Regan articulated what has become a critical touchstone 
in animal ethics: that all subjects-of-a-life merit ethical status. 
To be the subject-of-a-life involves more than merely 
being alive and more than merely being conscious. . 
. Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs 
and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the 
future . . . an emotional life together with feelings of 
pleasure and pain; preference-and welfare-interests; 
the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires 
and goals; a psychophysical identity over time .(Regan 
1983, 243)
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To such individuals ethical respect is owed; for they “have 
a distinctive kind of value—inherent value—and are not to be 
treated as mere receptacles” (243), that is, instrumentally.
“Not all living things,” he specifies, in critiquing Albert 
Schweizer’s “reverence for [all] life” ethic, “are subjects of a 
life” and thus do not have “the same moral status” (245). Only 
to such subjects do we humans have “direct duties” (245). He 
concludes by enumerating this summary principle: “We are to 
treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that 
respect their inherent value” (245, italics his).
In his Preface to the Second Edition of The Case for Ani-
mal Rights (2004) Regan clarifies that he restricts the idea of 
“subjects-of-a-life” to “mentally normal mammals of a year 
or more” (Regan 2004, xvi), thus severely restricting and, in 
my view, compromising the concept. While perhaps under-
standable as an ethical or political maneuver (to avoid hav-
ing to include bacteria, for example, as subjects-of-a-life), this 
stipulation is untenable, given his aforementioned definition of 
“subjects-of-a-life.” For it is incontrovertible that a bacterium 
has desires, goals, perceptions, a sense of preference as to what 
is good or bad for it (and in this regard some sort of feeling or 
emotion), as well as the ability to initiate action and make deci-
sions—an evaluating consciousness; in short, a “psychophysi-
cal identity over time” (see, for example, Adler and Tso 1974; 
Margulis 2001). 
Acknowledging that bacteria are in fact subjects-of-a-life 
need not, however, leave us in an irresolvable ethical impasse; 
but it does require further theoretical refinement of what con-
stitutes human ethical obligation toward animals and other liv-
ing entities. In order to begin to do so, it seems useful to review 
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the various pertinent theories from antiquity to the present that 
have been proposed over time to characterize living individu-
als or what Regan has called “subjects-of-a-life.” It will be my 
contention that one can discern common features—a common 
definition even—in the models proposed by many of the major 
theorists of organism from Aristotle to Kant to certain contem-
porary biologists. This general paradigm conceives the living 
organism as physical matter (atoms) that is organized according 
to a form-al purposive design (telos) that is nonphysical, non-
material, independent of material determinism (physical laws), 
organized thusly into a self-contained and self-motivated unit 
or individual, who has a continuing inner identity and subjec-
tive point of view (subjectivity). Such an individual is separate 
from its surrounding environment (Umwelt) but in dialectical 
or dialogical meaning-ful relationship with it, and it has the 
capacity to override the physical laws governing matter—en-
tropy—the freedom to act otherwise than in accordance with 
the laws of physics (gravity, for example). 
Many of these ideas are already clearly and well developed 
in Aristotle’s writings, notably in De Anima, Metaphysics, and 
Physics. Underlying Aristotle’s conception of the living organ-
ism is the idea of entelechy, which means formal purposive 
design, deriving from the Greek enteles echein, “to have com-
pleteness.” This formal cause Aristotle terms “soul” (psyche). 
“The soul is the cause or source of the living body” (De Anima 
II.415b, in McKeon 1941, 561). (Esti dè ή psyche tou zoontos 
somatos aitìa kai arche [Peri Psyches 415b].) The Greek term 
psyche, while often translated as “soul” literally means “breath 
as the sign of life; life; spirit” (Liddell and Scott 1996, 798). It 
is best to keep these connotations in mind in order to avoid the 
theological accretions attached to the English word “soul.” 
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Fortuitously, the idea of breath opens into the concept of 
metabolism, which is essential to modern understandings of 
organismic identity (see further discussion below). And indeed 
Aristotle himself addresses the identity problem (highlighted 
in the Marilynne Robinson epigraph) as follows: Every object 
is held together as a unit identity by an “indwelling form”: 
“The substance is the indwelling form, from which the matter . 
. . is derived” (Metaphysics VII.1036, in McKeon 1941, 802). In 
the case of living organisms the “indwelling form” or psyche is 
entelechy. “The actuality of whatever is potential [έntelecheia] 
is identical with its formulable essence” (De Anima II.425b, 
McKeon 1941, 562) (Ëti toú dunámei ontos logos ή έntelecheia 
[Peri Psyche 415b].) The term “ontos logos” forms the basis 
of the English ontology, and it means the “form of being” or, 
as here translated, “formulable essence.” Thus, έntelecheia 
means the underlying final design or essential form that shapes 
or causes the identity and character of an individual organism. 
That is its “soul,” a nonmaterial form-al, cause-al essence; it 
is intrinsic and teleological. Aristotle: the soul or psyche is “a) 
the source of origin of movement . . . b)the end [autes telos] . . 
. [and] c)the essence [auton tropon] of the whole living body” 
(De Anima II.415b, in McKeon 1941, 561) (Peri Psyches 415b); 
in other words, the defining ontological essence of an organ-
ism. 
Writing in a vastly different intellectual environment, many 
centuries later, Immanuel Kant likewise concluded that living 
entities appear to operate in accordance with teleological prin-
ciples. In his “Critique of the Teleological Judgement” (1790), 
observing “the purposiveness [Zweckmässigkeit] of nature” 
(Kant 1957, 448), Kant wrote, “nature specifies its universal 
laws according to principles of purposiveness for our cognitive 
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faculty” (Kant 1957, 460), adding “the laws of simply mechani-
cal causality do not suffice” (460). 
Kant held, however, that our knowledge of nature must 
always be limited by our cognitive faculties and while math-
ematical laws, known through the analytic judgment, offer 
a high order of certainty, they do not adequately explain the 
processes of nature, which can better be understood through 
the teleological judgment, which is nevertheless a human con-
struct and therefore less irrefutable than analytic reasoning. “It 
is quite certain that we cannot adequately cognise, much less 
explain, organized beings and their internal possibility, accord-
ing to mere mechanical principles of nature” (Kant 1957, 484). 
But “a determinate knowledge of the intelligible substrate of 
nature . . . quite surpasses our faculties” (Kant 1957, 486). 
Given these qualifications, however, Kant proceeds to ana-
lyze the “intelligible substrate” that underlies and determines 
natural creatures in Aristotelian teleological terms. “A thing 
exists as a natural purpose, if it is . . . both cause and effect of 
itself” (Kant 1957, 465). “A tree produces itself as an individual. 
. . . The matter that the tree incorporates it previously works up 
into a specifically peculiar quality, which natural mechanism 
external to it cannot supply” (Kant 1957, 466). “An organized 
being is not a mere machine . . . but it possesses in itself forma-
tive power of a self-propagating kind which it communicates 
to its materials though they may have it not of themselves; it 
organizes them” (Kant 1957, 469). In an (acorn) nutshell, that is 
the gist of Kant’s position; namely, that there is a non-physical, 
non-material organizing force or spirit (entelechy) intrinsic to 
each individual living organism. This “soul” or psyche cannot 
be explained by the laws that govern physical matter. So that 
while the organism is constituted of physical matter (atoms), 
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that matter is qualitatively changed as it is incorporated into a 
living organism. “The organisation of nature has in it nothing 
analogous to any causality we know” (Kant 1957, 469). But that 
causality, he specifies, insofar as we can understand it, appears 
to be teleological. “The cause which brings together the re-
quired matter [in the organism], modifies it, forms it, and puts 
it in its appropriate place, must always be judged teleological” 
(Kant 1957, 472).
Unfortunately, Kant ends his discussion on an anthropocen-
tric and theistic note, but his characterization of the teleological 
processes of nature remain pertinent today and has been picked 
up by biology theorists such as Andreas Weber and Francisco 
J. Varela in the twenty-first century (see further discussion be-
low).
Kant’s rejection of mechanistic conceptions of nature clearly 
is a refutation of Descartes’ and his followers’ characteriza-
tion of natural entities as machines, a paradigm that came 
to dominate early modern science and which persists today, 
justifying such ethically condemnable practices as transgenic 
engineering of animals. A counter tradition continued in Ger-
many, however, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, culminating perhaps (or reemerging) in the theories of 
biologist Hans Driesch in the early twentieth century. Though 
these German biologists largely adhered to Kant’s teleological 
theory, as scientists they formulated their theories on the basis 
of material evidence. As Kant wrote to one of the earliest of 
these biologists, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, in August 1790 
(at the time he was publishing his “Critique of the Teleologi-
cal Judgement”) “Your recent unification of the two principles, 
namely the physio-chemical and the teleological . . . has a very 
close relation to the ideas that currently occupy me but which 
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require just the sort of factual basis that you provide” (Lenoir 
1982, 24). 
These theorists, whom Timothy Lenoir labels “teleomecha-
nists” in his book on the subject (Lenoir 1982, 24), rejected 
theistic teleology and are not to be confused with the German 
Naturphilosophen, who spiritualized nature. But they also re-
jected Cartesian and ultimately Darwinian mechanistic views 
of nature, contending that “the laws of chemistry and physics 
[are not] able to account for the obvious ‘Zweckmässigkeit,’ the 
teleonomy built into biological systems” (Lenoir 1982, 235). 
Biologist Ernst von Baer, perhaps the most important te-
leomechanist in the middle decades of the nineteenth centu-
ry, used an embryological paradigm to characterize his view, 
claiming that there is a prior informational pattern that shapes 
the resulting unfolding of the individual through the embry-
onic process. He called this a “Gestaltungskraft” (Lenoir 1982, 
125)—a “shaping power—and he posited that it exists in the 
ovum before fertilization (Lenoir 1982, 81). This “Trieb [drive] 
is of a completely different character from its constitutents. . . . 
The laws it obeys are teleonomic rather than strictly mechani-
cal” (Lenoir 1982, 125). And he held that “the whole is onto-
logically prior to and determinative of its parts, that the whole 
directs the organization of its parts” (Lenoir 1982, 128). 
Von Baer’s term teleonomic has been picked up by some 
modern biologists in preference to teleological with its theistic 
accretions. For example, one biologist explains, “the decoding 
of the DNA programs of information can properly be said to 
be a teleological—or teleonomic process” (Ayala 1998, 42). As 
this statement suggests, current usage derives in part from cy-
bernetic and information theory, which emerged in the 1940s.
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The term teleonomia stems from the Greek telos (goal) 
and nomos (custom, law); the latter term also entails “musical 
strain” or “song” (Liddell and Scott 1996, 467). Ernst Mayr, a 
leading biological theorist of the concept, proposed this defini-
tion: “A teleonomic process or behavior is one which owes its 
goal-directedness to a program” (Mayr 1974, 98). A program, 
he explains, acknowledging its derivation from information 
theory, is “coded or prearranged information that controls a 
process (or behavior) leading it toward a given end” (Mayr 
1974, 102). Examples include computer software programs or 
DNA in living organisms. The program thus is a kind of infor-
mational blueprint that includes algorithmic instructions as to 
how the information is to manifest itself. It is a virtual form 
whose potentiality is realized in the enactment of an actual 
real phenomenon. We are thus not far removed from Aristo-
tle’s entelechy, which, recall, was defined as “the actuality of 
what is potential” (McKeon 1941, 562). As Rupert Sheldrake 
has proposed, the modern notion of a teleonomic program is 
indeed largely entelechy redux. Genetic programs, he notes, 
“are inherited, purposive, holistic organizing principles; they 
do everything entelechies were supposed to do. They do not 
consist of matter per se, but of information. And information is 
what puts form into things, it in-forms; it plays the same role as 
entelechy, but it sounds more scientific” (Sheldrake 1991, 106). 
In a series of lectures delivered at the University of Aber-
deen in 1907-8 and published as The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism (1908), Hans Driesch presented the most sub-
stantial pre-contemporary theory about the teleonomic char-
acter of living matter. Driesch revived Aristotle’s entelechy 
and substantiated his claims with extensive examples gleaned 
from his own scientific practice and knowledge, particularly in 
the field of regeneration and embryology. (He is known for his 
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1892 experiments with sea urchin embryos in which he showed 
that you can divide its blastomere down to one surviving cell 
that will nevertheless grow into a complete sea urchin, prov-
ing that there is a teleological or teleonomic formative force or 
entelechy at work in the basic unit of living matter.) Continuing 
in the Kantian tradition and bolstered by his own experiments, 
Driesch rejected mechanistic theories of organism. “No kinds 
of causality based upon the constellations of simple physical 
and chemical acts can account for organic individual develop-
ment” (Driesch 1908, 142). Something else is at play and that 
something else is entelechy: Aristotle’s teleological idea that 
“there is at work a something in life phenomena ‘which bears 
the end in itself,’ ô echei έn éaton tò tέlos” (quoting from Aris-
totle) (Driesch 1908, 144). “Entelechy . . . rule[s] the individual 
morphogenesis” (Driesch 1908, 227). “Entelechy means the 
faculty of achieving a ‘forma essentialis’; being and becoming 
are united” (Driesch 1908, 149).
Driesch points out that in addition to embryogenesis many 
other life processes, such as metabolism, immunity, and the re-
generation of tissue cannot be explained mechanistically. Some 
nonmaterial directive organizes the process. Driesch therefore 
seems to be working toward a more general ontological theory, 
which establishes entelechy as the defining ontological charac-
ter of living beings, differentiating them thus from inorganic 
matter (Driesch 1908, 205). “Entelechy [is] an elemental onto-
logical entity” (Driesch 1908, 328). Ernst Mayr, decades later, 
concurred (without using the term entelechy: “The occurrence 
of goal-directed processes is perhaps the most characteristic 
feature of the world of living organisms” (Mayr 1974, 98).
Driesch seems, however, to realize that the concept of entel-
echy, while it may well characterize various natural processes 
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and is itself non-material, still functions in a fairly mechanical 
way (as in embryogenesis) and thus doesn’t adequately explain 
conscious mental decision-making, which also has physical 
results. In addition, therefore, to entelechy, the “natural agent 
which forms the body,” Driesch posits a similar “elemental 
agent which directs” the body (Driesch 1908, 82). To the lat-
ter he gives the unfortunate term psychoid. Derived from the 
Greek word psyche and the suffix –oeide, which stems from ei-
dos (“shape” or “form”), the concept psychoid thus implies the 
“manifest shape or form of the spirit, soul or mind” (Addison 
2009, 126). By psychoid Driesch thus seems to mean the men-
tal agent that directs the arm to lift when “I” will it to do so. In 
a later work Mind and Body (1916) Driesch adds a third mental 
agent, the mind, which is the locus of subjectivity: “My self in 
its discontinuous existence in continuous time has a continuous 
basis, and I name this my mind” (Driesch 1927, 126).
The mind, psychoid, and entelechy appear to be of the same 
ontological substance, operating on a contiuum. “My mind . . 
. is metaphysically at the same time something which enters 
non-mechanically into nature as a natural factor called ‘entel-
echy’ or ‘psychoid’” (Driesch 1927, 135). All of these forces are 
purposive or teleological in character and all are non-physical 
motivating forces. While Driesch’s theories in the latter work 
seem inadequate and underdeveloped, they point by their very 
inadequacy to the developments in recent theorizing about or-
ganism that emphasize and explore the question of subjectivity 
and consciousness, which the concept of entelechy elides and 
the concept of psychoid doesn’t adequately address. 
Interest in questions about the subjectivity that accompanies 
teleological organization has drawn the attention of prominent 
theorists of biology in the latter twentieth and early twenty-first 
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centuries. Perhaps the most important of these is Hans Jonas, 
whose The Phenomenon of Life (1966) and The Imperative of 
Responsibility (1984) remain critical sources in the endeavor. 
Following Jonas (and Kant) German philosopher Andreas We-
ber and Chilean biologist Francisco J. Varela developed the 
concept of autopoeisis to characterize living organisms, an 
idea further developed by Canadian philosopher Evan Thomp-
son in Mind in Life (2007). These theorists begin with ideas 
that are not far removed from earlier theories about entelechy 
but end up by emphasizing the subjective reality that is inher-
ent in any organized living entity and the attendant emotional 
character inherent in that subjectivity, which itself establishes 
a foundation for meaning and value. 
For Jonas, as Weber and Varela point out (2002, 112): “me-
tabolism [is] the core of the organism’s ontology.” For in metab-
olism one sees that there is a non-physical “form” that directs 
the process of “the exchange of matter with its surroundings” 
(Jonas 1966, 75). Such a form constitutes a separate, autono-
mous identity. The “passing contents” processed by metabo-
lism “enter and leave” but the core identity is sustained apart 
from the “foreign matter passing through” by the “living form. 
It is never the same materially and yet persists as its same self” 
(Jonas 1966, 76). As Weber and Varela amplify, for Jonas a 
living organism is “an ontological center . . . that is not ex-
plainable by the features of the underlying matter” (2002, 119). 
“Form arranged by metabolic processes . . . is constant, where-
as substance, the mere molecules, rather are an accidental ag-
glomeration of matter” (Weber 2002, 185). “For Jonas,” Weber 
notes, “the organism’s identity is very different from its mate-
rial composition.” What is involved in the metabolic process is 
“an eternal real transubstantiation” (Weber 2016, 37). 
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Ninety-eight per cent of the atoms in one’s body are in fact 
replaced every year, Evan Thompson points out (2007, 151), 
yet one’s core identity persists. Physicist Richard Feynman put 
the same fact more poetically: atoms in the brain, he remarked 
“can remember what was going on in my mind a year ago—a 
mind that has long since been [physically] replaced . . . there 
are always new atoms, but always doing the same dance, re-
membering what the dance was yesterday” (Feynman 2001, 
244, as cited in Robinson 2015, 262). Who or what is choreo-
graphing the dance remains the unanswered question. 
Jonas and other more recent theorists, under the influence of 
phenomenology, go beyond their Aristotelian predecessors to 
emphasize the “inner horizon” (Jonas 1966, 211) or subjectiv-
ity of the directive teleological choreographer of living mat-
ter. “Organisms,” Jonas specifies, “are obviously organized for 
inwardness, for internal identity, for individuality” (1966, 90). 
“Inwardness,” indeed, he maintains, “is coextensive with life” 
(1966, 58). This “internal identity” Jonas terms a “self” (1966, 
82-3). 
And that inner self or psyche is purposive, i.e., teleologically 
focused. In a reprise of Aristotle, who wrote, “in everything 
the essence is identical with the ground of its being, and . . . in 
the case of living beings, their being is to live, and of their liv-
ing the soul in them is the cause or source” (De Anima II.415, in 
McKeon 1941, 561), Jonas emphasizes that the goal or telos of 
any living organism is to live, to survive. “There is always the 
purposiveness of organism as such and its concern is living” 
(1966, 90). Jonas sees this purposive subjectivity as embedded 
in all living forms as well possibly in “inanimate nature. . . . 
The ‘soul’ and . . . the ‘will’ is . . . a principle . . . of nature” 
(1984, 65). (In The Imperative of Responsibility Jonas veers to-
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ward a kind of panpsychism, positing that some sort of “subjec-
tive striving” must have propelled primordial amino acids to 
form cells [1984, 73].)
In any event, such purposive intentionality is apparent in all 
living forms, including plants and the most primitive animal-
cules such as amoebae:
effective already in all vegetative tendency, awaken-
ing in primordial awareness in the dim reflexes, the 
responding irritability of lowly organisms; more so in 
the urge and effort and anguish of animal life endowed 
with motility and sense-organs; reaching self-transpar-
ency in consciousness, will and thought of man [sic]; 
all of these being inward aspects of the teleological 
side in the nature of “matter” (1966, 91).
In short, “there is no organism without teleology; there is no 
teleology without inwardness” (1966, 91). 
Unlike inorganic matter, however (and here Jonas veers 
away from panpsychism), “living things are creatures of need. 
Only living things have needs and act on needs” (1966, 126). 
They are motivated “by continuous emotional intent” to reach 
a goal, such as food, to fuel the metabolic process (1966, 101). 
Such “intentional action is directed toward a good” (1966, 127), 
that is, what is good for the organism and its survival. Thus 
even “the dimmest ‘feeling’ of the amoeba” is a reflection of 
the “‘mental’ realm [which] comprise[s] all forms and grades 
of subjective being” (1966, 89n.).
Metabolism is thus, as Evan Thompson points out, “imma-
nently teleological,” in that it reflects an “immanent purposive-
ness” which operates according to “internal norms that deter-
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mine whether otherwise neutral events are good or bad for the 
continuation of the organism” (2007, 152). Thus, a bacterium 
moves toward sucrose, because it “knows” that substance will 
benefit it. Sucrose thus acquires meaning for the bacterium. It 
is not just its physio-chemical make-up but food (2007, 157-8). 
Biologist Francisco Varaela, relying on Jakob von Uexküll’s no-
tion of the “Umwelt” (as does Thompson) (Von Uexküll 2010), 
similarly observes how the sucrose molecules obtain meaning 
and value from the subjective point of view of the bacterium. 
“There is no food significance in sucrose except when a bacte-
rium swims up gradient and its metabolism uses the molecule 
in a way that allows its identity to continue” (Varela 1991, 86). 
The organism’s telos is thus subjectively sustained by an inner 
decision-making “self.” The decision to choose this or that or 
to move here or there cannot be explained by physio-chemical 
mechanism. Something else is at play. There is an “I” there. 
Varela explains, “whatever is encountered,” by the organism, 
“must be valued one way or another—like, dislike, ignore—
and acted on one way or another—attraction, rejection, neu-
trality . . . which gives rise to an intention (I am tempted to say 
‘desire’), that unique quality of living cognition” (Varela 1991, 
97). 
Varela and his Chilean associates developed the term auto-
poeisis to characterize the living organism. The term means 
literally “self-making” from the Greek autos and poiein. As 
Thompson explains, it means “an autonomous . . . self-deter-
mining system” (2007, 37). “An autopoietic system is thus an 
individual that begins to be worthy of the term self” (2007, 75). 
Unlike pre-twentieth-century theorists of organism, Weber and 
Varela emphasize that subjectivity is inherent in the autopoietic 
process. There is in “the radical transition [of matter] to the 
existence of an individual . . . the origin of ‘concern’ based on 
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its ongoing self-produced identity . . . the instauration of a point 
of view provided by the self-construction” (Weber and Varela 
2002, 116). Thus mechanistic theories of metabolism and en-
telechy or algorithmic theories about genetic programming are 
inadequate because they ignore the directive feeling self within 
the organism.
By “accept[ing] autopoiesis as embodied teleology, we re-
introduce the subject into biology” (Weber and Varela 2002, 
117). “Organisms,” thus “can be said to transcend the neutral-
ity of pure physics and to create their own concern” (Weber 
and Varela 2002, 118). “Subjectivity,” in short, “is the absolute 
interest the organism takes in his continued existence’ (Weber 
and Varela 2002, 119). 
Not only then do these theorists reintroduce the subject into 
biology, they also reintroduce feeling and emotion. As Jonas 
notes, organisms in their desire to survive are motivated by 
“continuous emotional intent” (1966, 101). Weber notes (2016, 
40-41) that Jonas has in effect substituted “Sentio” for the Car-
tesian cogito: “I feel, therefore, I am.” “I feel” should be under-
stood broadly to mean “I need, I have concerns, I care.” Such 
a determination therefore locates care at the ontological center 
of the organism: “I care, therefore, I am.” The organism exer-
cises care in its discriminatation between what is positive or 
life-affirming and what is negative or life-threatening. It thus 
organizes and sees its Umwelt in accordance with these quali-
tative evaluations. In this way the environment is identified and 
selected—gains meaning—in accordance with values that are 
immanent to the organism. The Umwelt is not neutral physio-
chemical matter. I am not indifferent to the passing world. I 
have preferences. Things have meaning and value for me. I 
care what happens. As Weber explains, in this view life is not a 
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“neutral, value free process but rather illuminates reality with 
its sharp light of felt values, of existential meaning, and thus of 
an emotive rather than rational foundation” (2016, 41). 
Jonas therefore establishes that “the capacity to feel is the 
mother-value of all values” (1992, 88, as cited in Weber 2016, 
41). I might amend that to claim that the ability to care is the 
mother-value of all values, for caring about what surrounds one 
and how it impacts one establishes meaning and value even 
in the most primordial of one-celled organisms. Such care in 
more complex organisms goes well beyond survival, extended 
to caring that what is cared-for or beloved—whether it be other 
organisms or other life-enhancing phenomena—survive. Car-
ing may thus be seen as ontologically definitive of life—of all 
life forms. 
In The Imperative of Responsibility (1984) Jonas argues that 
what one might call caring purposiveness, which every organ-
ism exhibits, establishes the basis for an ethic. 
In purposiveness . . . we can see a fundamental self-
affirmation of being, which posits it absolutely as the 
battle over against nonbeing. . . . The mere fact that be-
ing is not indifferent toward itself makes its difference 
from nonbeing the basic value of all values, the first 
“yes” in general. (81)
Thus affirmation of life by the individual organism can be 
seen as the basis for a life-affirmative ethic embraced by all 
and for all. 
Such indiscriminate generalizations recall, however, Sch-
weizer’s expansive “reverence for life” ethic, which Regan 
rightly criticized as too broad to be meaningful as a practical 
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ethic. So, while in general, one can embrace the general thrust 
of Jonas’ theory—that one should respect the life-affirmative 
desires of all living organisms and should, wherever possible, 
support them in their struggle against non-being—and thus 
avoid harming or killing them—further discriminations are 
needed for when the interests and desires of various life-forms 
conflict, as they inevitably will.
Here I will only briefly point to a few possible further dis-
criminations. One is that the criterion of feeling and emotional-
ity establishes an ontologically significant and ethically action-
able distinction between animals and plants. Another distinc-
tion between animals and plants is motility. (Aristotle posited 
that animals have sensory and locomotive “souls,” which plants 
lack, having only nutritive “souls.” [De Anima II.412b-413b, in 
McKeon 1941, 557-60].) Bodily movement requires decision-
making and therefore some sort of decision-maker within, and 
thus a conscious core within. It may well be that motility and 
consciousness are conjoined, that the one requires the other. 
(Varela suggests as much [1991, 89].) Such a conscious core—
a subject-of-a-life—which is indubitably present in animals, 
mandates ethical status, as Regan noted. But acknowledging 
such status does not determine what is or should be ethical ac-
tion toward other subjects-of-a-life; it only opens up the pro-
cess of judging what that action should be. 
One has to posit, for example, that one has oneself a right 
to exist and survive and therefore a right to self-defense (see 
Donovan and Adams 2007, 4). This need not imply a “selfish 
gene” ethic, which, as Sheldrake has pointed out, reflects the 
ideology of capitalism, where “individualist, selfish, and com-
petitive characteristics . . . taken for granted by free-enterprise 
economic theories are then projected onto genes” (1991, 100). 
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But it does establish the desire for survival of oneself and what 
one values as a primary ethical principle. Nor does it mean a 
return to neo-Darwinian or Hobbesian notions of a struggle of 
all against all, for the inherent capacity to care, which is here 
posited as the ontological essence of all beings, provides the 
basis for an ethic that respects and sympathizes with others’ 
desire to survive. I have advocated elsewhere that such sympa-
thy should form the basis for ethical treatment of animals (see 
especially 1990, 1996, 2006, 2013), and that one has an espe-
cial ethical obligation toward living entities with whom one can 
communicate to the extent of understanding their desires and 
needs (2017 and 2018). 
But a stipulation of the right of self-defense establishes a 
basis for the treatment of, for example, bacteria. Where they 
are harmful to one’s survival they may be destroyed. But it is 
now becoming apparent that many bacteria are not harmful but 
beneficial, indeed symbiotically essential to the functioning of 
many if not most organisms (see Yong 2016). Thus it is not a 
matter of simplistically claiming that bacteria as autopoietic 
organisms have “rights” too, as some have perhaps facetiously 
claimed (see Weisberg 2014, 106-9, for a critique of this no-
tion). It is a rather matter of respecting bacteria’s teleological 
role in the biosphere and leaving it alone where it is not harm-
ing other subjects.
An ethic of respect for the biological integrity of living 
forms, such as adumbrated here, seems essential to counter 
current techno-scientific enthusiasm for transgenic manipula-
tion of animals, which as Zipporah Weisberg and others have 
pointed out, causes “unfathomable suffering and humiliation” 
to animals thus manipulated (2014, 102. See also Donovan 
2017b for a critique of specious justifications for transgenic 
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engineering). Such invasive interventions also cause countless 
animal deaths, the “collateral damage” of failed experiments. 
(In creating a transgenic rabbit, for example, the mother rabbit 
is killed, as well as 97% of the offspring who are not trans-
genic. [Youngs 2002, 72].)
Weisberg proposes, in a vein consonant with the aims of this 
article, that respect for animals’ “ontological unity and entel-
echy . . . the recognition that all beings possess a trajectory 
of possibilities that are meaningful for them” (2014, 102) must 
form the ethical basis for objecting to transgenic engineering 
and other invasive technologies that tamper with the organ-
ism’s teleological identity. 
In a recent article Weisberg locates human ethical respon-
sibility in knowledge therefore of an organism’s “phenom-
enological entelechy” (2015, 11, emphasis added). In the vein 
of von Uexküll and French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, 
Weisberg stresses that our ethical obligations should be rooted 
in our knowledge of an organism’s essential telos, giving as 
example a cow’s metabolic process. “A cow munching on grass 
is not just realizing her store of energy. . . . Rather she is be-
coming who she is and ought to be” (2015, 13). It is a matter of 
a cow being the cow she is, for “every being is its own grand 
narrative,” as Andreas Weber remarked (2016, 4). In short, in 
the concept of entelechy, as Driesch maintained, “being and 
becoming are united” (1908, 149). 
The apparent division between the two aspects of the form-al 
directive entity that governs organismic activity—which Dri-
esch divided into “entelechy” and “psychoid”—the former gov-
erning more or less autonomic activities like metabolism; the 
latter making decisions regarding an organism’s movement—
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are likewise seen to be teleologically united. A subject or self 
makes decisions in accordance with the teleological design of 
the organism, which it knows implicitly. The subject (of-a-life) 
makes decisions in accordance with the teleologically-defined 
life of which it is a subject. The cow as subject seeks out grass, 
chews her cud, and knows to chew it, because she knows im-
plicitly that that metabolic process will enable her teleological-
ly-determined identity as cow to continue. It enables her both 
to become—in the sense that the incoming physical matter will 
become—that is, be transubstantiated into—the living mate-
rial of her body—and it enables her to thus be a cow.
There is therefore, in short, a compelling teleological order 
in nature that humans, as part of that order, should honor and 
respect. Much modern scientific and cultural practice obscures 
and/or overrides the fact that all living creatures exhibit an on-
tological integrity that is essential to their identity and well-
being. Those practices that violate that integrity, it is here pro-
posed, are ethically indefensible.
In summary, then, major thinkers about the question of what 
constitutes a “subject-of-a-life” have concluded that there is a 
mysterious and not-yet-understood designing force that is on-
tologically definitional to living organisms; it is made up of, 
on the one hand, an intrinsic teleological choreographic pro-
gram—whatever one may call it (entelechy, psyche, soul, or 
DNA code)—and, on the other, a caring purposive subject, a 
“psychoid.” While many of the teleologically-organized pro-
cesses in the former category are largely prescripted, there is 
as well in animals consciously-directed motility, which estab-
lishes the existence of a decision-maker within who is aware 
of the teleologically prescripted identity of the organism and 
makes decisions in accordance with its needs, and whose chief 
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value is the maintenance and survival and well-being of that 
organism’s identity, its “phenomenological entelechy” (Weis-
berg 2015, 11).
We have seen characterized as emotional this dimension of 
the organism, in that creatures as subjects, as purposive selves, 
care in accordance with their goal-directed ontological es-
sence, which adumbrates their basic goals, needs, and inter-
ests. By their behavior and other semiotic signals living enti-
ties communicate these “desires” to other subjects. As I have 
argued elsewhere (most recently 2017a), humans in receipt of 
these communications, which are readily understandable, have 
an ethical obligation to pay them attention and to respect them, 
where such accommodation will not do harm. We share with 
other organisms this basic caring attribute. Perhaps indeed as 
Weber suggests, caring is definitional to the nonphysical com-
municative substrate of the “biosphere,” which, he proposes “is 
built on existential concern. We are part of it, and we can feel 
it, too. Indeed, the ability to feel our own and others’ existential 
needs is our most fundamental biological power” (2016, 41). 
For, as ecofeminist Marty Kheel once noted, “our capacity for 
empathy and care [remain] our most important human connec-
tion with the natural world” (2008, 251). Such caring mandates 
that we treat as inviolable the “phenomenological entelechy” 
of other “subjects-of-a-life” and abjure modern scientific prac-
tices that mutilate and betray naturally-endowed “soul.”
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